While standard contract theory suggests that a CEO should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effects of sector performance (otherwise referred to as luck), there is overwhelming evidence that CEO pay is strongly and positively related to such luck. In this paper, we offer an explanation for the observed pay for luck. We provide a simple model of CEO pay in an environment where the executive is charged with selecting and implementing the firm's strategy. For our purposes, strategy is interpreted as the choice of magnitude of the firm's exposure to sector performance. Thus, a firm's realized exposure to sector performance is at least partially under the CEO's control and not permanently fixed. To optimally choose her firm's exposure, a CEO needs to be incentivized. Hence, pay contracts will be both positively related to sector performance, and in some situations asymmetrically related to good and bad performance. Our model also suggests that we should observe more pay for luck in situations in which the CEO is afforded greater strategic flexibility to change the firm's exposure to sector performance. Using a multitude of proxies that are meant to capture the extent of strategic flexibility in firms, we find strong empirical support for our model. Our evidence is robust to alternate explanations such as CEO entrenchment.
Introduction
One of the key predictions of compensation theory is that optimal incentive-based pay should depend on variables under the manager's control and not on those over which the manager has no control (see Weisbach (2007) for a summary). In light of this, the finding by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) that executives are paid for firm performance due to market factors potentially beyond their control (what they coin "luck") is a priori puzzling. This "pay for luck" evidence is also at the crux of the managerial power hypothesis of CEO compensation.
This hypothesis, most prominently put forth by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) , argues that CEOs have captured the pay process and impose undue influence on it. However, an interesting and yet overlooked question is whether the empirically-measured luck is really something over which the executive has no control? In this paper we argue that the answer to this question is no. In fact, while there are clearly market forces at work that are beyond the executive's control, the manager typically has at least some discretion over the firm's exposure to such forces through the choice of the firm's strategy.
A similar observation is made by Holmstrom (2005) who points out that "if John Browne's (CEO of British Petroleum) incentive pay were insulated from oil price shocks, it would affect the way he thinks about exploration and how he reacts to price shocks once they occur. Even comparisons with other oil companies or the overall stock market could influence his risk choices."
In this spirit, we propose a simple model to formalize incentive contracts when a firm's exposure to movements in the market is the CEO's strategic choice. Our model shows the optimality of pay for luck in compensation contracts and also highlights the situations in which the reward for luck is more likely to appear. We then take the predictions of the model to the CEO compensation data and find significant empirical support.
It is well known that both the level of executive pay and its sensitivity to stock prices have increased significantly since the 1980s (Hall and Liebman (1998) ), with the bulk of the real increase coming in the past two decades (Frydman (2007) ). For example, the average CEO pay in our sample (for all ExecuComp firms) has increased from $2.3 million in 1992 to $9.2 million in 2006. Stark criticism of such increases has come from both the academic and practitioner camps (see Bebchuk and Fried (2003) , Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) , Crystal (1991) , and Rappaport (1999) ) who call these increases a windfall rather than performance-driven payouts.
Consistent with this view, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that CEO pay is as sensitive to exogenous forces (luck), as it is to firm-specific performance (what they coin skill). A similar finding appears in the empirical literature on relative performance evaluation Samwick (1999a, 1999b) , and Antle and Smith (1986) ) which highlights the absence of any market or industry benchmarking. Oyer (2004) suggests that pay for luck can be justified if one takes into account the fact that the CEO's outside opportunities may rise and fall with market levels, and thus firms that wish to retain their CEOs must pay for luck in order to ensure that they are not hired away by other firms. While this explanation is probably part of the story, it doesn't generate much cross-sectional variation in the likelihood of observing pay for luck nor does it seem to explain the asymmetry in pay-for-luck exposures as documented by Garvey and Milbourn (2006) . These authors show that when good luck manifests itself in the positive realization of industry (or broad market) returns, executives' pay packages load positively on such movements, whereas when such external benchmarks are down (i.e., bad luck is realized), executives' pay is significantly less sensitive to those benchmarks. Our model speaks to the cross-sectional variation in observed pay for luck and can explain this asymmetric pay for luck relationship in an optimal contracting setting.
Our view in this paper is that an attempt to understand CEO pay should first specify what CEOs actually do for the firms that employ them. The longstanding modeling choice in the literature considers a standard agency setup, assuming that firm performance depends on the CEO's (personally) costly effort and some random factors over which the CEO has no control.
The objective of the optimal contract is to incentivize the CEO to exert effort to maximize firm value. In reality, most would argue that all CEOs work hard, and what really separates the winners from the losers is the CEO's chosen strategy for deploying a firm's assets. One could think of a CEO's primary responsibility is to put forth a vision for the firm and navigate its strategic initiatives. In doing so, the CEO concerns herself with the firm's strategic direction in lieu of its surrounding market environment: Where is the market or industry going? How does the firm fit into the marketplace? Going forward, what type of exposure to the market or industry is optimal for the firm, and how should one steer the company accordingly? Such a situation forms the basis of our analysis to model the CEO's job as one of choosing the firm's strategy, which in turn affects the firm's exposure to sector movements. 1 It is important to note that industry benchmarks are just a special, observable case of the general theory we have in mind. The CEO could choose an exposure to anything relevant for her firm, but industry returns happen to be something we can measure.
There is significant anecdotal support for our assumption that the CEO actively influences firm strategy. As Holmstrom (2005) points out, " [t] he reason CEOs and other people with business expertise sit on boards is that they are better placed to learn about the firm's strategy and understand how management thinks about it. This information is especially important when a CEO retires or when the firm runs into trouble and the board needs to figure out whether the current management has what it takes to get out of the trouble." To this end, McKinsey & Company surveyed 586 global corporate directors and these respondents reported that 24% of board time was spent on the development and analysis of strategy. 2 In addition, Bennedsen, Pérez-González and Wolfenzon (2007) demonstrate the impact of CEOs on firm value using a natural experiment involving CEO-family deaths. The findings of Bennedsen, Pérez-González and Wolfenzen (2007) sensibly suggest that the CEO is not an otherwise passive agent who only puts forth effort that affects a firm's output, but instead adds value through the host of actions and decisions she makes vis-à-vis the firm's strategic course. It is in this manner that we model the CEO's role in the firm. Our model is also in the spirit of the recent work of Frydman (2007) and Murphy and Zábojník (2007) that suggest that over time, CEOs have become more highly valued for their general management skills, rather than firm-specific knowledge. This is akin to a world where CEO ability is linked explicitly to broader firm-level initiatives (such as the choice of firm strategy), rather than directed efforts only valuable to a single firm.
In our model, a CEO is charged with choosing the firm's strategy as she faces uncertainty regarding future sector movements. She has the ability to put forth a (personally) costly effort to generate an informative signal about future sector returns. Pay for luck arises in the optimal contract as a mechanism to incentivize the CEO to exert effort to forecast the sector movements and choose the firm's optimal exposure to them. As our model shows, the absence of pay for luck will make firm investment decisions insensitive to sector movements, which is suboptimal if sector performance affects project payoffs. Another contribution of our model is to show that the optimal contract rewards a risk-averse CEO more for good luck than punishes her for bad luck; that is, the optimal contract is asymmetrically sensitive to good and bad luck. Our model also helps pin down situations in which pay for luck is more likely to be present. What we find is that pay for luck and asymmetry in pay for luck are more likely to be observed (i) in firms that offer greater strategic flexibility to the CEO to alter firm exposure to sector movements; and (ii) for a talented CEO whose cost in generating the signal about sector returns is lower.
With the theory's empirically-testable predictions in hand, we turn to CEO compensation data spanning 1992 through 2006 and find strong empirical support for the model. Confirming previous studies, we first document that CEO compensation is dependent on luck (i.e., sector performance). To test whether the sensitivity of pay for luck is greater in firms that offer more strategic flexibility, we introduce five proxies meant to capture the extent of strategic flexibility.
Our first two proxies rely on the levels of capital investment and R&D expenditures in an industry to identify firms that allow for greater strategic flexibility. The idea is that firms in industries with higher levels of investment or R&D expenditures are likely to provide their CEOs with greater strategic flexibility. In these industries, the CEO has more latitude to scale up or down such expenditures and thereby change the firm's exposure to market conditions. This conjecture is also consistent with Bennedsen, Pérez-González and Wolfenzen (2007) who show that CEOs have a greater impact on firm value in industries with higher profits, greater R&D investments, etc.
Our third proxy for strategic flexibility is the extent of liquidity of the firm's assets. The assumption here is that firms with more liquid assets are likely to offer their CEOs greater strategic flexibility by virtue of the ease of buying and selling these assets. Our fourth proxy is the proportion of tangible assets to total assets in a firm. We argue that firms with more tangible assets offer less flexibility as those assets are more likely to be specific to current operations. Our fifth and final proxy is a dummy that identifies firms with multiple divisions. Multi-divisional firms are likely to offer their CEOs greater flexibility to change the overall firm exposure to sector movements by shifting resources across the divisions through its internal capital market. Consistent with our model's prediction of greater pay for luck in firms with more strategic flexibility, we find that pay for luck is indeed significantly greater in firms in industries with higher levels of investment, more R&D expenditures, more liquid assets, less tangible assets, and multiple divisions. Our results are also robust to controlling for the quality of firm level corporate governance using the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index. Robustness to this index suggests that our findings related to strategy flexibility do not stem from CEO entrenchment. Consistent with the evidence in Garvey and Milbourn (2006) , we also find evidence of asymmetric pay for luck in our sample as well. In line with our model, we find that the asymmetry in pay for luck is present in firms that offer greater strategic flexibility to their CEOs as identified by our five proxies.
Our model also predicts that pay for luck will be greater for more talented CEOs. We use two proxies for CEO talent, previously used in Milbourn (2003) , to test this prediction. Our first proxy for CEO talent is based on the classification of CEOs as internal or external to the firm.
We classify a CEO as an external hire if she joined the firm within two years of becoming CEO; otherwise she is categorized as being an internal hire. The idea here is that externally-hired CEOs, who are recruited through a market search process, are likely to be more talented than CEOs promoted from within. The intuition for this is that if the board is willing to forgo a viable internal candidate who likely dominates an external one in terms of firm-specific knowledge, the external candidate probably is viewed as the more talented executive. We find that pay for luck is greater for externally-hired CEOs in comparison to CEOs who rise through the firm's internal ranks. Since internal CEOs (relative to external hires) are the ones more likely to be entrenched and exercise a greater degree of control over the pay process, our evidence of greater pay for luck for external CEOs does not support the hypothesis that pay for luck results from CEO entrenchment. Our second proxy for CEO talent is CEO tenure. The idea here is that CEOs with longer tenures (e.g., Jack Welch in General Electric) have obviously survived a greater number of retention/dismissal decisions made by the board of directors. Such CEOs are likely to be more talented and in a position to make better strategic decisions. Consistent with our theory, we find evidence of greater pay for luck for CEOs with longer tenures. We also observe asymmetry in pay for luck for more talented CEOs, as measured by those with longer tenures and who are recruited from outside, as our model predicts.
Overall, our empirical analysis provides significant support for our model and highlights that at least for certain firms, the observed pay for luck may be designed to provide appropriate strategic incentives to the CEO. Our contribution in this paper is thus to offer an optimal contracting explanation for the observed pay for luck in CEO compensation. In doing so, we also highlight a different way to model a CEO's role in a firm as one of choosing a firm's exposure to sector movements. In sum, we want to emphasize that while it may be true that there are some badly governed firms in which CEOs capture the pay process, we feel that the widespread presence of the pay for luck phenomenon and its persistence over time highlight that it may not be all about inefficient rent extraction. The phenomenon may simply be part of an optimal incentive contract in a world where the role of the CEO is to select a firm's strategy by managing its exposures to external factors relevant to its performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we delineate the primitives of our model and derive the optimal compensation contract in a world where CEOs choose the firm's strategy by altering its exposure to sector movements. Section 3 contains our empirical examination of the model's testable predictions. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
In this section, we analyze a simple model that helps us characterize the optimal incentive contract when CEOs can change a firm's exposure to its sector performance through the choice of firm strategy. The model delivers four empirically-testable hypotheses that we take to the data in the next section.
Agents and Economic Environment
We consider a one-period economy with two dates (t = 0, 1), in which an all-equity firm is owned by risk-neutral investors and managed by a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO). At t = 0, the CEO chooses a one-period project to be implemented. This project is a reflection of the firm's strategy, and henceforth we refer to this choice as such. The CEO can choose between two alternative strategies. One is a high-risk strategy denoted by subscript H, and the other is a low-risk strategy denoted by subscript L. The realized return from implementing either strategy, R i with i ∈ {H, L}, is equal to β i R m + ε, where β i is a measure of the riskiness of strategy i and R m is the realized sector return. We have β H > β L ≥ 0. Typically in the CEO compensation literature, the term β i R m is referred to as the "luck" component of firm performance. Although in our model the CEO can actually influence this portion of firm performance, we continue with the literature's tradition and refer to it as the luck component of firm performance. The key assumption in our model is that by the choice of her strategy, the CEO affects the firm's exposure, β i , to sector performance. The term ε represents the idiosyncratic component of firm performance. It is assumed to be common to both strategies and is independently distributed with respect to R m on support (−∞, ∞), with E(ε) = 0 and Var(ε) = σ 2 .
It is useful to pause here and highlight the main difference between our approach and that used in the extant literature. This will also serve to provide some early intuition for the optimality of pay for luck in our setting. The extant literature has typically modeled firm performance R as, R = α(e) + βR M + ε, where e denotes CEO effort. The realized firm performance consists of three components: a component due to CEO effort, α(e), a luck component resulting from sector performance, βR M , and a noise component, ε. Since CEO effort does not influence the luck component of firm performance in this specification, it is obvious that pay for luck is not needed to induce CEO effort. The main innovation in our paper is to recognize that at least for some firms, the realized sector exposure depends on CEO effort. That is, as opposed to the above specification, we model firm performance as, R = α(e) + β(e)R M + ε. Thus, in our specification the firm's realized exposure to the sector performance, β(e), depends on CEO effort. Given this specification, our model highlights the optimality of pay for luck and shows how it varies with firm and CEO characteristics. Since our main objective is to study the optimality of pay for luck and its cross-sectional variation, for simplicity we suppress the term α(e) in specifying firm performance. We now lay out the rest of our model. The probability that the CEO generates S is the effort supplied by her, e ∈ [0, 1], at a personal cost of δe 2 /4. With probability 1 − e, the CEO fails to generate S, in which case her information set contains only the prior belief.
At t = 1, both the CEO and the investors can observe and verify the firm's realized return from the chosen strategy, R i , and the realized sector performance, R m , whereas the investors do not observe the CEO's effort choice (e), the chosen strategy (β i ) and ε. 3 The problem confronting the investors is to design an appropriate compensation contract to incentivize the CEO to exert effort to uncover the sector return and choose the optimal strategy accordingly.
Since the investors only observe R i and R m , any incentive contract can only be contingent on these two variables. To start with, we assume a linear contract of the form W = w 0 + wR i , where w 0 represents fixed pay, and w is the sensitivity of pay to the firm's return. Note that the contract is independent of R m . We relax this assumption subsequently to allow W to be dependent on R m . Note also that in our model, firm performance is predominantly driven by sector performance R m . Hence, in our subsequent discussions we refer to the loading on firm performance, w, as the pay for luck. The CEO's utility is given by V CEO (W ) − δe 2 /4, where V CEO (W ) is an increasing and concave function of W , i.e., V CEO > 0 and V CEO < 0. The CEO's reservation utility is given by the constantV CEO > 0.
Optimal Pay for Luck
Suppose the CEO exerts an effort e, then with probability e she generates the signal S. Conditional on her efforts generating the signal S, she optimally chooses the high-risk strategy (β H ) if S = +s, and the low-risk strategy (β L ) if S = −s. With probability 1 − e she fails to generate S, in which case she unconditionally chooses either the high-risk or the low-risk strategy. The CEO's expected utility, given any compensation contract denoted by (w 0 , w), can be written as
where i ∈ {H, L} indicates the strategy (β i ) chosen by the CEO when she fails to generate S.
The terms in the first set of square brackets represent the CEO's payoff when she generates the signal S. This equals the sum of her payoff when S = +s (which occurs with probability 1/2) and she optimally chooses the high-risk strategy (β H ), and her payoff when S = −s (which also occurs with probability 1/2) and she optimally chooses the low-risk strategy (β L ). The terms in the second set of square brackets represent the CEO's expected payoff when she fails to generate S and chooses either the high-risk or the low-risk strategy unconditionally. The last term is the CEO's personal cost of effort provision.
The investors' corresponding expected payoff, denoted as V I (w 0 , w, i), is 
and e = arg max
In the above problem, the incentive-compatibility constraint in equation (3) stipulates that the chosen effort level maximizes the CEO's expected utility given the contract (w 0 , w). The CEO's participation constraint is given by the weak inequality (2) . For analytical tractability, we assume that the CEO has a mean-variance utility function over her monetary compensation, i.e.,
, where λ > 0 measures the CEO's degree of risk aversion. 4 We term the CEO's ability to change the firm's exposure in response to expected sector performance as the extent of strategic flexibility. In our model, this is measured by the distance between the betas, i.e., β H − β L . Note that in the trivial case when β H = β L , there is no flexibility for the CEO to alter firm exposure in response to the sector movements. The CEO of a firm with higher degree of strategic flexibility (i.e., larger β H − β L ) has more latitude in choosing the firm's exposure to the sector performance. We now provide our first result on the structure of the optimal incentive contract.
Proposition 1.
The optimal incentive contract has a positive loading on luck:
which is strictly increasing in the extent of strategic flexibility, β H − β L , and decreasing in the effort disutility parameter, δ.
The intuition is as follows. The CEO's compensation is contingent on luck (i.e., w * > 0) to ensure that she has sufficient incentive to exert effort to uncover the sector performance and choose the optimal strategy accordingly. Lack of pay for luck will result in the CEO shirking and choosing either the high-or low-risk strategy unconditionally, and hence the firm's exposure will be insensitive to the sector performance. To see why w * is increasing in β H − β L , note that the marginal benefit of CEO effort to the investors is increasing in β H − β L , since the benefit of correctly matching the firm's exposure to sector performance increases as β H − β L increases.
Thus, as β H − β L becomes larger, the investors increase the contract's loading on luck to induce more effort from the CEO. 5 Finally, the loading on luck is decreasing in the effort disutility parameter δ, since the cost of inducing effort is increasing in δ. In our empirical analysis, we interpret δ in the spirit of cross-sectional variation in CEO talent, with a more talented CEO having a lower δ. In light of this, Proposition 1 indicates that CEOs identified as being more talented are likely to be paid more handsomely for luck.
We now relax our original assumption on the contractual form and analyze a more general one which allows the loading on firm performance (and hence on luck) to depend on R m . More specifically, we assume that the investors offer the CEO a piecewise linear contract with W = w 0 +wR i when R m = +r m , and W = w 0 + wR i when R m = −r m , wherew is the loading on firm performance when the sector performance is good and w is the loading on firm performance when the sector performance is bad. In further discussion we refer tow as the loading on good luck and w as the loading on bad luck. Analyzing this general contract helps us explore any potential asymmetry of pay for luck in the optimal incentive contract. This leads to our next result which is delineated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The optimal compensation contract, denoted as (w * 0 , w * ,w * ), has the following properties:
1. it loads positively on both good luck and bad luck (w * > 0 and w * > 0);
it loads asymmetrically on good and bad luck (w * > w * ); and 3. the degree of asymmetric pay for luck is increasing in the extent of strategy flexibility
The intuition for this proposition is as follows. Observe first that the result that the CEO should be paid for luck obtains with the general contract. As explained before, the CEO's compensation is contingent on luck (i.e., w * > 0 andw * > 0) to ensure that she has sufficient 5 Although for a fixed w * , an increase in β H − β L itself induces the CEO to exert more effort, that additional effort alone is typically not sufficient from the investors' perspective. This is because the CEO only enjoys a fraction of the gain from the increase in strategic flexibility and the ability to correctly match exposures to sector performance. Hence, notwithstanding the greater effort resulting from an increase in β H − β L , the investors increase w * to induce greater effort.
incentive to exert effort to uncover the sector performance and choose the optimal strategy accordingly. The two loadings on luck, w * andw * , however, serve two slightly different incentive purposes. The loading on bad luck, w * > 0, ensures that the CEO does not shirk and unconditionally choose the high-risk strategy (β H ), whereas the loading on good luck,w * > 0, ensures that the CEO does not shirk and unconditionally choose the low-risk strategy (β L ). To see this, note that when w * > 0, the CEO suffers a loss if she under-supplies effort and chooses β H whenever she fails to generate S and the low sector return R m = −r m is realized. Similarly, whenw * > 0, the CEO forgoes a compensational gain if she under-supplies effort and chooses β L whenever she fails to generate S and the sector booms (i.e., R m = +r m ) occur. Given risk aversion, the CEO's incentive to avoid the loss when R m = −r m is ceteris paribus stronger than her incentive to avoid forgoing her compensational gain when R m = +r m . Hence, the investors rely to a lesser extent on the compensation contract to incentivize the CEO against shirking and choosing the high-risk strategy unconditionally relative to choosing the low-risk strategy unconditionally. Thus, the optimal compensation contract for a risk-averse CEO exhibits asymmetry in pay for luck, rewarding the CEO more for good luck than bad (i.e.,w * > w * ).
Moreover, as the firm's strategic flexibility increases (i.e., β H −β L becomes larger), in order to incentivize the CEO to exert more effort, the loadings on both good luck and bad luck increase.
Given CEO risk aversion, each unit increase in the loading on bad luck (w * ) ceteris paribus produces a stronger incentive effect than each unit increase in the loading on good luck (w * ).
Thus, to provide appropriate incentives, the reward for good luckw * increases more than reward for bad luck w * . That is, the asymmetry in pay for luck,w * − w * , is increasing in the firm's strategic flexibility, β H − β L .
Empirical Predictions
In this section we list the main empirical predictions of our model. From Proposition 1 we know that the optimal incentive contract rewards the CEO for firm performance resulting from sector movements. Thus, the optimal contract does not remove the "luck" component of firm performance. This forms our first prediction:
Optimal incentive contracts will reward CEOs for luck.
Support for this prediction can be found in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) . One important aspect of testing Prediction 1 is that our model is quite specific about the nature of the "luck" component that is likely to affect CEO compensation. It is reasonable to argue that CEOs, through their choice of strategy, will be able to shift the firm's exposure within a broad industry segment and not necessarily across industry segments. Thus, the luck that matters for CEO compensation according to our model, should be that resulting from industry returns. To test this prediction, we repeat the tests of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) for our extended sample period ensuring that the luck is measured using industry returns.
From Proposition 1, we also know that the reward for luck will be greater for CEOs managing firms that offer greater strategic flexibility. We use a number of proxies to identify firms that From Proposition 2, we know that in the optimal contract we havew * > w * . This implies that the optimal contract rewards the CEO more for good luck than punishes her for bad luck, that is, the optimal incentive contract is asymmetric in pay for luck. Our prediction is thus in line with the results of Garvey and Milbourn (2006 Similar to Prediction 2, our model predicts that we should observe asymmetry between pay for good and pay for bad luck in incentive contracts for CEOs in firms that offer greater strategic flexibility. Note that strictly speaking, Proposition 2 predicts greater pay-for-luck asymmetry in firms that offer greater strategic flexibility to the CEO. Our ability to test this prediction is compromised by a couple of issues. The first one is the above noted bias in estimating the extent of pay for luck asymmetry. Second, when we estimate the pay for good and bad luck for the sub-sample of firms that offer more or less strategic flexibility, the pay for either good luck or bad luck is insignificant in a number of cases. This makes comparison of the difference in coefficients across the two sub-samples difficult. Given these issues, we confine our tests to establishing the presence of pay for luck asymmetry in the sub-sample of firms that offer strategic flexibility to the CEO. Summarizing, our third prediction yields the following: we identify CEOs appointed from outside the firm as being more talented than inside CEOs, since these executives managed to overcome their relative lack of firm-specific knowledge and get hired anyway. Our second proxy is the tenure of the CEO. The idea is that CEOs with longer tenures are more likely to be talented and hence in a position to make better strategic choices.
Furthermore, we know from Proposition 2 that any incentive contract that rewards for luck will be asymmetric in its reward for good and bad luck. This predicts that incentive contracts for talented CEOs are also likely to be asymmetric in its reward for good and bad luck. Thus, our final prediction is: 
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we describe our data, lay out our empirical methodology, and provide the main results stemming from the tests of our model's predictions.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data for testing our predictions are drawn from two standard sources. 
Empirical Specification and Key Variables
In testing our predictions, we are broadly interested in examining how CEO compensation is related to the systematic component of firm performance (luck). To do this, we follow the approach used in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and break the test into two stages. In the first stage, we calculate the luck and firm specific components of the firm's dollar return. We achieve this using the following specification:
where the subscript i indicates the firm, m indicates the market, t refers to time in years and the term T refers to a matrix of time dummies. The dependent variable y is the annual stock return and X represents the return on a set of sector indices. We scale both firm stock return and the sector return by each firm's market capitalization at the beginning of the year. In the baseline specification, the sector indices include the equal-and value-weighted industry returns, where industry is identified at the level of the two-digit SIC code. As discussed earlier, industry returns are most relevant for testing our model implications. For robustness, later we repeat our tests by including equal-and value-weighted portfolio returns of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks, the return on the S&P 500 index and the return on the firm's size-decile portfolio. Since many of these indices are highly correlated with industry returns, not surprisingly we obtain similar results with these as well. Furthermore, since all of these are imperfect measures of the sector return that is likely to be relevant for choosing a firm's strategy, we may misclassify some luck and firm-specific portions of performance. Because our tests are based on how CEO pay is related to the luck component of firm performance in the cross section, measurement error is unlikely to bias our conclusions. Note also that even our tests are likely to be biased towards finding asymmetry in the pay for luck relationship because we only estimate one average loading for a firm. Due to the noise in short-term return measures and the lack of sufficient observations, we are unable to estimate time varying-loadings for a firm. As mentioned earlier, taking into account the potential bias, we confine our tests to establishing the presence of asymmetric pay for luck in the sub-sample of firms that offer more strategic flexibility and for more talented
CEOs. Based on the estimation of the above equation, we estimate the luck component of firm performance as:
where β and µ t represent the coefficient estimates from (5) . The difference between firm stock return and the luck component is referred to as the firm-specific component.
Having estimated the luck and firm-specific components of firm performance, in the next stage we estimate how CEO compensation varies with these two. To do this, we follow the approach of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) on the pay for performance relationship and estimate the following model:
where the dependent variable z is the level of compensation. We use three alternative measures of CEO compensation. Our first measure is the executive's total direct compensation, Total
Compensation, which is a sum of the CEO's yearly salary, bonus, other annual compensation, where +ve Luck (−ve Luck ) is a dummy variable that takes the value one when Luck is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. We now present our empirical results, starting with the summary statistics.
Summary Statistics
In Panels A & B of Table I, at the 1% level and we estimate robust standard errors throughout our analyses.
[ Table I goes here]
Critical to our ability to test the hypothesis that CEOs change firm exposures to sector returns is the fact that the benchmark can take both positive and negative values. Table II summarizes the percentage of the observations for each benchmark that are positive, as given in the column denoted as percent positive. Not surprisingly for our sample period, a large proportion of our sample contains positive benchmark returns.
[ Table II goes here]
Empirical Results
With the data and empirical strategy in hand, we now proceed to empirically test our model's four predictions.
Pay for Luck
We begin our empirical analysis by testing Prediction 1 to see if there is evidence of pay for luck.
These tests are similar to those in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) with the one important difference being that our sample period is longer than theirs. We repeat the tests to ensure that the results hold in our sample as well. The results are reported in Table III . In Column
(1), the dependent variable is Total Compensation. The positive coefficient on Luck confirms pay for luck. In Columns (2) and (3), we repeat the estimation with Bonus and Option Grants as measures of compensation, respectively, and find the existence of reward for luck for option grants, whereas it is statistically insignificant for bonus payments. Our point estimates are also consistent with earlier papers. The point estimates in Column (1) imply that for a CEO of a firm with median risk, an additional $1,000 increase in firm value arising from market movements (luck) will increase the CEO's total compensation by $1.962, bonus payouts by just under 22 cents, and new option grants by 88 cents.
[ Table III goes here]
Strategic Flexibility and Pay for Luck
One main advantage of our theory is that it identifies specific situations in which pay for luck should be more prevalent. As mentioned in Prediction 2, we expect greater pay for luck in firms that offer greater strategic flexibility to the CEO. We now test this prediction. We use five alternate proxies to identify firms which offer greater strategic flexibility. First, we use the level of capital expenditures in an industry and classify industries with higher than the sample median capital expenditures as offering greater flexibility to the CEO to change firm exposure.
We define a firm's industry at the level of the four-digit SIC code and measure the industry capital expenditures each year as the median ratio of Capital Expenditures over Total Assets of all firms in that industry. We repeat our tests in sub-samples with above and below the sample median industry capital expenditure levels. As can be seen from Columns (1) and (2) Option Grants also load to a greater extent on luck for firms in industries with higher capital expenditures. These results offer support for our theory.
In Panel B, we use the level of R&D expenditures in an industry to identify flexible industries.
We measure the industry R&D expenditures as the nonzero R&D expenditures in the median firm in that industry. We classify industries with R&D expenditures above the sample median as offering greater strategic flexibility to the CEO. The idea here is that by scaling up or down R&D expenditures, CEOs can alter the speed of new product introduction and hence the sensitivity of firm performance to sector movements. The evidence in Panel B again shows that when pay is measured using Total Compensation, pay for luck is present only in firms with higher R&D expenditures. This offers further evidence in support for our theory and shows that at least for some firms, pay for luck may be optimal and is aimed at providing incentives for the CEO to choose the appropriate strategy.
We use the liquidity of the firm's assets as a proxy for the degree of flexibility offered by the firm in Panel C. Following Schlingemann, Stulz and Walking (2002), we measure asset liquidity using the level of mergers and acquisition activity in the firm's industry. For every industry identified at the level of the four-digit SIC code, each year we calculate the ratio of the total transaction value of mergers and acquisition activity to the market capitalization of all public firms in that industry. We then classify an industry as being liquid during a year if this ratio is above the sample median during that year. The idea here is that CEOs in more liquid industries have greater flexibility in altering the firm's risk exposure by buying or selling those liquid assets.
The evidence in Panel C shows that for all of our three measures of CEO pay, pay for luck is greater for firms in more liquid industries, again consistent with our theory.
Turing to the tangibility of a firm's assets as a proxy for the level of strategic flexibility offered by the firm, our next set of results is Panel D. We measure tangibility as the ratio of book value of property, plant and equipment to total assets. The idea here is that firms with more tangible assets are likely to have a greater proportion of assets that are specific to the current operations.
Such assets may be difficult to be deployed in alternative uses. Thus, firms with higher level of asset tangibility are likely to offer lower level of strategic flexibility to their CEOs. The evidence in Panel D again shows that when pay is measured using Total Compensation and as Option Grants, pay for luck is significantly greater for firms with less tangible assets, as our model suggests.
Finally, for our last proxy for strategic flexibility, in Panel E we classify the firms in our sample into conglomerates and single-segment firms and repeat our tests in these two subsamples. We classify a firm as a conglomerate if it reports positive sales and assets in divisions in two different three-digit SIC code industries. Here again, the assumption is that CEOs of conglomerates are likely to have greater strategic flexibility in changing firm exposure to market movements by shifting resources across the divisions. The results in Panel E shows that when pay is measured using Total Compensation and Bonus, pay for luck is indeed greater for conglomerates as compared to single-segment firms, which is consistent with our model.
Interestingly, all five of our strategic flexibility proxies yield results that support our theory.
The presence of pay for luck has often been quoted as evidence of poor firm level corporate governance (see Bebchuk proxied by the investment level in the industry, has a greater impact on the observed pay-forluck relationship than the quality of firm level governance as measured by the GIM Index. In unreported tests, we repeat our estimation with our alternate proxies for the extent of strategic flexibility provided by a firm after controlling for the GIM Index and find our reported results (in Panel B through E) unaffected.
[ Table IV goes here]
Strategic Flexibility and Asymmetric Pay for luck
In this section we test Prediction 3, which predicts asymmetry in the optimal pay for luck relationship. In Panel A of Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and also in line with our model's predictions.
In Panels B through F of Table V , we repeat our estimation to see if the asymmetry in pay for luck is present in firms that offer greater strategic flexibility to the CEO. In Panel B, we divide the sample into firms in industries with high and low capital expenditures. As mentioned earlier, industries with higher capital expenditures are likely to offer greater strategic flexibility to the CEO. In our tests we confine to establishing pay for luck asymmetry in industries with higher capital expenditures. We do this because of the bias in estimating pay for luck asymmetry and because on average, the pay for luck is insignificant in the sub-sample of firms from industries with lower capital expenditures. But for providing a overall picture, in Panel B, we repeat the estimation in both the sub-samples with high and low capital expenditures. Consistent with our prediction, we do find asymmetry in the pay for luck relationship in the sub-sample with high capital expenditures. In unreported tests we find that the coefficients are statistically different.
In Panel C, we use the extent of R&D expenditures in the industry as a measure of strategic flexibility and find that there is asymmetry in the pay for luck in firms in high R&D industries.
This again offers evidence consistent with our theory.
We use the liquidity of the firm's assets as a proxy for the extent of strategic flexibility offered by the firm in Panel D. Consistent with our model, we find that the asymmetric pay for luck is indeed present for firms in industries with greater asset liquidity. In Panel E, we use the tangibility of a firm's assets as a proxy for the extent of strategic flexibility offered by the firm, and in Panel F we repeat our estimation on the sub-samples of conglomerates and single-segment firms. In all the tests, consistent with our model, the asymmetry in pay for luck is present in the sub-sample of firms that offer greater strategic flexibility to the CEO.
[ Table V goes here]
CEO Talent and Pay for luck
In In Panel B, we use CEO tenure as the second proxy for CEO talent. The idea is that CEOs with longer tenures are likely to be more talented. To test for greater pay for luck for more talented CEOs, we divide our sample into two sub-samples: CEOs with tenure above the median tenure of the sample and CEOs with tenure below the median tenure of the sample.
We then repeat the estimation in both the sub-samples. The results reported in Panel B of [ Table VI goes here]
In Table VII , we test to see if the asymmetry in pay for luck is present for more talented
CEOs. As before in Panel A, we classify CEOs as internal versus external and identify external CEOs as being more talented, and in Panel B we use CEO tenure as a proxy for talent. Consistent with our model, we find that the asymmetry in pay for luck is indeed present for more talented CEOs.
[ Table VII goes here]
Conclusion
Over the past fifteen years, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has risen nearly four times over, In this paper, we provide a simple model of firms employing CEOs to select and implement the firm's strategy, and that this strategy choice manifests itself in realized exposures to sector returns. Ultimately, we attribute at least a portion of the firm's returns that correlate with sector returns to the CEO's decision to have just such an exposure. Optimal compensation necessarily evolves in such a setting, and predicts the positive relationship uncovered empirically between CEO pay and luck. In fact, our analysis suggests that filtering out the portion of a firm's performance that is attributable to sector or broad market forces would actually distort CEO incentives. Our analysis also suggests that the positive reward for luck should be more prominent in firms for which the CEO has greater flexibility to change the firm's strategy by altering its exposures. Using a novel set of proxies for strategic flexibility, we uncover strong empirical support for this prediction. In future work, we hope to move beyond our current empirical focus on industry returns and explore the implications of modeling a CEO's action space as one of selecting her firm's exposure to anything relevant to the firm.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The CEO's incentive-compatibility constraint, (3), can be written as
We claim that given any contract, the CEO is indifferent between choosing the high-and low-risk strategies when she fails to generate the private signal S. To see this, note that if the CEO fails to generate S and
Without loss of generality, we assume that the CEO always chooses the low-risk strategy β L if she fails to generate S. The CEO's participation constraint, (2), can then be written as
On the other hand, the investors' objective function, (1), can be written as
Substituting both (A1) and (A2) into (A3), we can rewrite the investors' optimization problem as
Denote the solution as w * , we have
It is clear from (A5) that w * is increasing in β H − β L and decreasing in δ.
Proof of Proposition 2:
If the CEO always chooses the high-risk strategy (β H ) when she fails to generate the private signal S, then the CEO's incentive-compatibility constraint, (3), can be written as
On the other hand, if the CEO always chooses the low-risk strategy (β L ) when she fails to generate S, then we have
Thus, in equilibrium we have
Note that we must havew * > w * > 0 in order for (A8) to hold. The reason is as follows. First, if
Thus, we must have
To show thatw Market Value is the firm's equity market capitalization at the end of the firm's fiscal year. Salary and Bonus represent the CEO's yearly salary and bonus values, respectively. Option Grants represents the Black and Scholes value of the options granted to the CEO in the year. Total Compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and the value of restricted stock and stock option awards. Age is the CEO's age in the data year, and Tenure for any year is calculated as the difference between the fiscal year-end of that year and the date at which the CEO became CEO as given by the BecameCEO field in ExecuComp. Stock return is the one-year percentage return for the firm over its fiscal year. The standard deviation of stock returns, Volatility, is computed using the five years of monthly data preceding the data year. Compensation data are in thousands, and market values are in millions of yearly dollars. This table reports the summary statistics of the two market indices that we use in our baseline specification to estimate the luck and firm-specific components of firm performance: equal-weighted industry return and value-weighted industry return. We define the firm's industry at the level of the two-digit SIC code. The data are collected for every firm in which a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in ExecuComp is identified as defined by the CEOANN field for each year 1992-2006. The percent positive (negative) represents the proportion of the sample for which the relative benchmark return is positive (negative). Compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and the value of restricted stock and stock option awards,
Bonus is the bonus award during a year and Option Grants is the Black and Scholes value of option grants during a year. Luck is the systematic component of firm performance estimated using the equal-and value-weighted industry returns, where industry is defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Firm Specific is the residual firm performance and is estimated as the difference between firm return and the systematic component of firm return. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the coefficients on the intercept, the CDF of the dollar variance return, and the year and executive fixed effects are suppressed for convenience. The compensation data are from ExecuComp, and stock returns are from CRSP. The sample includes all CEO-firm year data from ExecuComp after excluding CEO transition years and firms with fiscal year ending other than December for the years 1992-2006. The standard errors are clustered at individual executive level. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% ( * * * ), 5% ( * * ) and 10% ( * ) levels.
Panel A: Pay for Luck
Total Compensation
Bonus
Option Grants (1) and (2), Bonus in Columns (3) and (4), and Option Grants in Columns (5) and (6) . Total Compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and the value of restricted stock and stock option awards, Bonus is the bonus award during a year and Option Grants is the Black and Scholes value of option grants during a year. Luck is the systematic component of firm performance estimated using the equal-and value-weighted industry returns, where industry is defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Firm Specific is the residual firm performance and is estimated as the difference between firm return and the systematic component of firm return. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the coefficients on the intercept, the CDF of the dollar variance return, and the year and executive fixed effects are suppressed for convenience. In Panel A we report results for firms in industries with above and below median capital expenditures, in Panel B we report results for firms in industries with above and below median R&D expenditures, in Panel C we report the results for sub-samples of firms with high and low levels of asset liquidity, in Panel D we report results for sub-samples of firms with asset tangibility above and below the sample median, in Panel E we report the results for conglomerates and single-segment firms, and in Panel F we report the results for firms in industries with above and below median capital expenditures after controlling for the quality of firm level governance using the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) .468
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for the sub-samples of firms in industries with above and below median R&D expenditures. .525
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance after dividing the sample into firms in industries with above and below median asset liquidity. We measure asset liquidity using the methodology of Schlingemann, Stultz and Walking (2002). .55
.637
.795
.481
.405
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for the sub-samples of firms with above and below median asset tangibility. .592
.698
.681
.619
.556
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for firms in industries with high and low levels of investment. In these regressions, we control for the quality of firm governance using the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) (1) and (2) 
Luck × (+ve Luck) .471
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for the sub-samples of firms in industries with above and below median R&D expenditures. 
Luck × (+ve Luck) .529
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for the sub-samples of firms in industries with above and below median asset liquidity. 
Luck × (+ve Luck) This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for the sub-samples of firms in industries with above and below asset tangibility. 
Luck × (+ve Luck) .537
.669
.687
.376
.471
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for conglomerates and single-segment firms. (1) and (2), Bonus in Columns (3) and (4), and Option Grants in Columns (5) and (6) . Total Compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and the value of restricted stock and stock option awards, Bonus is the bonus award during a year and Option Grants is the Black and Scholes value of option grants during a year. Luck is the systematic component of firm performance estimated using the equal-and value-weighted industry returns, where industry is defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Firm Specific is the residual firm performance and is estimated as the difference between firm return and the systematic component of firm return. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the coefficients on the intercept, the CDF of the dollar variance return, and the year and executive fixed effects are suppressed for convenience. In Panel A we report results for the sub-samples of internal and external CEOs, and in Panel B we report the results for the sub-samples of CEOs with above and below median tenure. The compensation data are from ExecuComp, and stock returns are from CRSP. The sample includes all CEO-firm year data from ExecuComp after excluding CEO transition years and firms with fiscal year ending other than December for the years 1992-2006. The standard errors are clustered at individual executive level. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% ( * * * ), 5% ( * * ) and 10% ( * ) levels. This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for internal and external CEOs. (4) and Option Grants in Columns (5) and (6) . Total Compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and the value of restricted stock and stock option awards, Bonus is the bonus award during a year and Option Grants is the Black and Scholes value of option grants during a year. Luck is the systematic component of firm performance estimated using the equal-and value-weighted industry returns, where industry is defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Firm Specific is the residual firm performance and is estimated as the difference between firm return and the systematic component of firm return. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the coefficients on the intercept, the CDF of the dollar variance return, and the year and executive fixed effects are suppressed for convenience. In Panel A we report results for the sub-samples of firms with internal and external CEOs, and in Panel B we report the results for the sub-samples of CEOs with above and below median tenure. The compensation data are from ExecuComp, and stock returns are from CRSP. The sample includes all CEO-firm year data from ExecuComp after excluding CEO transition years and firms with fiscal year ending other than December for the years 1992-2006. The standard errors are clustered at individual executive level. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% ( * * * ), 5% ( * * ) and 10% ( * ) levels.
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for internal and external CEOs. 
Luck × (+ve Luck) .53
.579
.689
.466
.393
This panel reports the results of the regression relating CEO compensation to luck and firm-specific components of firm performance for CEOs with above and below median tenure. 
Luck × (+ve Luck) .688
.828
.511
.584
